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Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Rosie Harding 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), which applies in England and Wales, makes legal provision for 
a wide range of people (family members, health and social care professionals, courts) to make 
decisions in the best interests of people who lack the capacity to make a decision for themselves 
(section 3). It applies to anyone who has impaired decision-making capacity as a result of ‘an 
impairment of the mind or brain’ (section 2). Two of the guiding principles of the MCA hold the key 
to considering this piece of legislation to be a women’s legal landmark.  
The first, and most important, is the statutory presumption that: ‘a person must be assumed to have 
capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity’ (section 1(2)). This creation of a statutory 
presumption of capacity is powerful, and of great importance for vulnerable women. Prior to the 
MCA, there was a common law presumption of capacity, but this was not clearly extended to those 
with impaired capacity ‘due to mental illness or retarded development’.1  The common-law 
presumption was also narrower than the statutory presumption in the MCA, applying primarily in 
the context of medical decision-making. The consequence of this statutory presumption is that it is 
for the person alleging a lack of capacity to prove that the person is unable to make their own 
decision, rather than the person having to provide evidence that they have capacity.  
The second significant aspect of the MCA is that where a ‘best interests’ decision is made or action 
taken because a person is unable to make their own decision, the least restrictive option is to be 
preferred (section 1(6). This approach prioritises the autonomy rights of disabled people, ensuring 
that any action taken in the best interests of the person is proportionate, and that their freedoms 
are appropriately protected. In the case of women with intellectual disabilities, the pre-MCA 
approach often resulted in court-approved sterilisation procedures, and this issue will serve as the 
primary exemplar of the importance of this legal landmark for women.  
 
Context 
 
Difficulty making decisions, or being considered to have the capacity to make one’s own decisions, 
can affect a remarkably large proportion of the population over the life course. Over 3 million people 
in the UK live with conditions that can cause difficulties with capacity, including learning disabilities, 
acquired brain injuries and dementia.2 According to Mind, the mental health charity, one in four 
people in the UK will experience a mental health problem each year.3 Whilst not all mental health 
problems result in diminished mental capacity, some mental health problems (like, for example, 
depression and anxiety) can make it very difficult for people to make decisions about their lives.  
More importantly, in the context of a legal landmark for women, gender has always played a 
considerable role in questions of (in)capacity in law and society. Women have higher rates of 
1 In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 112 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
2 Rosie Harding, ‘Statutory Wills and the Limits of Best Interests Decision-Making’ (2015) 78(6) Modern Law 
Review 945-970. 
3 Mind (2017) Mental Health Facts and Statistics. Available at: http://www.mind.org.uk/information-
support/types-of-mental-health-problems/statistics-and-facts-about-mental-health/how-common-are-mental-
health-problems/#  
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diagnosis with common mental disorders than men;4 women are at higher risk of developing 
Alzheimer’s Disease than men;5 and women were historically more likely than men to be diagnosed 
with ‘madness’, admitted to asylums, or given psychiatric ‘treatment’.6 The MCA’s legislative 
enactment of a presumption of capacity, and the requirement for the least restrictive option, have 
acted as an important legal corrective against the marginalisation of women through findings of 
incapacity or ‘madness’. 
The legal regulation of incapacity was historically a matter for the Royal Prerogative, the history of 
which can be traced back as far as 1339.7 The royal prerogative gave the King entitlements to land 
belonging to ‘idiots’ or ‘lunatics’, a duty to make provision for the ‘idiot’, and a requirement to 
return the land to the right heir of the ‘idiot’ on his death.8 The specific regulatory dimensions of the 
Royal Prerogative changed in scope over the centuries, eventually vesting in the Lord Chancellor, and 
the Court, to allow a wide inherent jurisdiction to do ‘whatever is necessary for the benefit of 
Lunatics.’9 The Royal Prerogative relating to property and affairs was formally abolished by the 
Mental Health Act 1959, and the power to administer the affairs of those who lacked capacity 
passed to the (old) Court of Protection. Under that legislation, whose powers were re-enacted under 
the Mental Health Act 1983, capacity was an ‘all or nothing’ determination: either a person had the 
capacity to deal with all of their property or they were considered to have no capacity at all. The 
Court of Protection jurisdiction under the 1959 Act only extended to property and affairs, usually 
exercised through the appointment of a ‘receiver’.10 Personal decision-making about health and 
welfare matters were addressed through a combination of compulsory treatment powers regarding 
hospital admissions, 11 and guardianship.12 Under the 1959 Act, guardianship was a wide ranging 
personal power, akin to that of a father over his under-age children. Guardianship powers were 
narrowed significantly under the Mental Health Act 1983, but this left a legal lacuna relating to 
health and welfare decision-making. Enduring Powers of Attorney were introduced in 1986 for 
property and financial affairs decisions, 13 but no equivalent power was available in respect of health 
and welfare decisions until the MCA. 
The Landmark 
 
The Law Commission, under Commissioner Brenda Hoggett (now Lady Hale), began a review of the 
law relating to mental incapacity in 1989. The first consultation paper14 set out the problems with 
the law at that time, particularly highlighting the lack of legal frameworks relating to consent to 
4 One in five women, compared to one in eight men: Sally McManus, Paul Bebbington, Rachel Jenkins, Tralach 
Brugha (eds.) (2016) Mental health and wellbeing in England: Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey 2014. Leeds: 
NHS Digital. Available at: http://content.digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB21748/apms-2014-full-rpt.pdf  
5 Women are approximately 1.5 times more likely to develop Alzheimer’s Disease (the most common form of 
dementia) than men: Rosie Erol, Dawn Brooker, & Elizabeth Peel (2015) Women and Dementia: A Global 
Research Review London: Alzheimer’s Disease International. Available at: https://www.alz.co.uk/women-and-
dementia last accessed 30 Jan 2017.  
6 Jane M Ussher. The Madness of Women: Myth and experience (2011) Routledge. 
7 T.C.S Keely, ‘One Hundred Years of Lunacy Administration’ (1943) 8(2) Cambridge Law Journal 195-200.  
8 Margaret McGlynn, ‘Idiots, Lunatics and the royal prerogative in early Tudor England’ (2005) 26(1) The 
Journal of Legal History 1-24. 
9 Keely, n 7 above, at p. 195. 
10 Mental Health Act 1959, ss. 100-121. 
11 Mental Health Act 1959, ss. 25-29. 
12 Mental Health Act 1959, ss. 33-34. 
13 Enduring Powers of Attorney Act 1985. 
14 Law Commission Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview (Law Comm Consultation 
No 119, 1991) 
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serious medical treatment.15 Around that period there had been a series of cases relating to 
sterilisation of mentally disabled young women,16 the most influential of which has been the 
decision in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. As well as authorising the sterilisation of 
an intellectually disabled woman, Re F has been credited with the foundation (or re-discovery)17 of 
what has become known as the ‘inherent jurisdiction’ of the High Court to make decisions on behalf 
of vulnerable and incapacitated adults. In that case, the House of Lords held that serious medical 
treatment could be given without consent to adults who lacked the capacity to give consent, where 
such treatment was justified by the doctrine of necessity. The Law Commission’s consultation paper 
highlighted three problems with this approach to medical decision-making concerning adults with 
impaired capacity: the limitations of the doctrine of necessity; the suitability of a ‘best interests’, 
rather than substituted judgment approach; and the use of the clinical negligence standard18 as the 
standard to be applied in determining best interests.19 Importantly, similar questions about the 
scope and appropriateness of best interests remain salient to this day.20 
Following a series of consultations on different aspects of the law,21 the final report on Mental 
Capacity, including a draft Mental Incapacity Bill, was published in 1995.22 A further decade passed, 
however, before the recommendations from the Law Commission were enacted through the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. In that time, use of the inherent jurisdiction had grown to fill the void left by the 
removal of most forms of guardianship. A group of 28 organisations and groups representing the 
interests of people with a range of intellectual and psychosocial disabilities came together to form 
the Making Decisions Alliance, and to lobby for the legislation. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came 
fully into force on 1 October 2007. The process of enacting the MCA therefore, took nearly two 
decades. At time of writing, the MCA approaches its tenth anniversary, and the legal landscape for 
people with impaired capacity has changed a great deal as a result of this statute.  
What happened next 
 
The MCA changed the shape of capacity law in England and Wales, catalysing a shift in 
understandings of ‘capacity’ in law from global, or person-specific, towards being granular and 
decision-specific. The central principles of the Act regarding decision-making by people with 
impaired capacity are: the presumption of capacity; the requirement to provide support and 
assistance in making decisions; and the requirement to respect unwise, but capacitous, decisions. 
These three principles all foreground decision-making by people with intellectual and psychosocial 
disabilities, supporting their rights to enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others.23 Where a 
person with an ‘impairment of the mind or brain’ is shown (on the balance of probabilities) to lack 
the capacity to make a decision for themselves, any decision made must be in their ‘best interests’ 
(section 1(5)). 
The inclusion of ‘best interests’ as an alternative when a person lacks decision-making capacity, 
however, creates a point of tension between English law in this area and international human rights 
15 CROSSREF St George’s Healthcare Landmark 
16 See Law Commission, 1991, [1.9] 
17 Ruth Hughes, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction over Vulnerable Adults’ 2013 Private Client Business 132. 
18 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
19 See Law Commission, 1991, pp 29-34. 
20Harding, 2015, n 2 above. 
21 Law Commission Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A New Jurisdiction (Law Comm 
Consultation No. 128, 1993); Law Commission Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: Medical 
Treatment and Research (Law Comm Consultation No. 129, 1993); Law Commission Mentally Incapacitated 
Adults and Decision-Making: Public Law Protection (Law Comm Consultation No. 130, 1993)  
22 Law Commission Mental Incapacity (Law Comm No 231, 1995) 
23 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 12. 
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law.24 Under the MCA, where a person lacks the capacity to make a decision, then decisions can (and 
must) be made in their ‘best interests’. In contrast, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities have called for the abolition of objective best interests decision-making in favour of a 
much more subjective approach focusing on the ‘best interpretation of the will and preferences’ of 
the individual.25  
The changes sparked by the MCA took some time to filter through to judicial decisions. Early cases 
decided under the MCA continued to use phrases like ‘P lacks capacity’,26 which have little meaning 
in the context of a law that presumes capacity and requires decision-specific capacity 
determination.27 Initially, jurisprudence from the Court of Protection considered ‘best interests’ as 
an objective test, rather than a reflection of the person’s wishes and feelings. The reasons for this 
include the guidance given in the explanatory notes to the MCA,28 alongside the continued use of 
the best interests balance sheet approach developed prior to the MCA in Re A (Male Sterilisation) 
[2000] 1 FLR 549. A turning point in consideration of the best interests approach under the MCA 
came when the first case under the MCA, Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James 
(2013) UKSC 67, was heard before the Supreme Court. In that case, Lady Hale took the opportunity 
to clarify that, ‘the purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the patient’s point 
of view’ (at [45]). This shift in the understanding of best interests has since been instrumental in two 
important cases deciding on matters relating to the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition.29 
Lady Hale was, of course, both the architect of the MCA whilst at the Law Commission, and the 
arbiter on its meaning whilst a Justice of the Supreme Court. It is likely that Lady Hale’s feminist 
principles have shaped the form and interpretation of the MCA. 
 
Significance 
 
Returning to the example of sterilisation of intellectually disabled women, which initially acted as a 
catalyst for law reform back in the late 1980s, helps to draw out the significance of the MCA as a 
women’s legal landmark. Comparing cases from that period with similar cases under the regulatory 
regime introduced by the MCA, we can excavate a shift in understandings of capacity and towards 
the least restrictive option for women. In the late 1980s a series of cases had authorised the 
sterilisation of disabled women, under the inherent jurisdiction, as necessary medical procedures. In 
Re F, for example, sterilisation was considered by the court to be in F’s best interests because she 
was in a sexual relationship, there was a ‘serious objection to each of the ordinary methods of 
contraception,’ and becoming pregnant would ‘from a psychiatric point of view, be disastrous’ (at 
53-54). Importantly, and perhaps surprisingly, no consideration was given to F’s capacity to consent 
to sex, despite the (infantalising) way the court described her mental capacity: ‘she has the verbal 
capacity of a child of two and the general mental capacity of a child of four to five’ (at 53).30 Nor was 
any substantive consideration given to F’s views about either the sterilisation operation or her sexual 
24 See further, Harding 2015, n 2 above. 
25 Committee on the Rights of People with Disabilities (2014) General Comment No. 1 on Article 12: Equal 
recognition before the law CRPD/C/GC/1. 
26 Under the MCA, the person at the centre of proceedings is referred to as ‘P’. 
27 Rosie Harding, ‘Legal Constructions of Dementia: Discourses of autonomy at the margins of capacity.’ (2012) 
34(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 425-442. 
28 MCA Explanatory Notes at [28]. 
29 M v Mrs N [2015] EWCOP 76; Briggs v Briggs [2016] EWCOP 53. 
30  The first civil case to consider capacity to consent to sex was X City Council v MB, NB and MAB [2006] EWHC 
168 (Fam); [2006] 2 FLR 968. See Ralph Sandland, ‘Sex and Capacity: The management of monsters?’ (2013) 
76(6) Modern Law Review 981-1009. 
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relationship. Rather, it was stated by the court that ‘she is unable to express her views in words but 
can indicate what she likes or dislikes … there is, however, no prospect of any development in her 
mental capacity’ (ibid). 
By way of contrast, in A Local Authority v K [2013] EWHC 242 (COP), decided under the MCA, the 
court declined to make an order that sterilisation was in the best interests of K, a young woman with 
Down’s Syndrome. This was because she was not sexually active, and less restrictive forms of 
contraception were considered to be a more appropriate first line response if the situation arose 
where it was required. There have continued to be cases under the MCA where sterilisation has 
been thought to be in the best interests of the person at the centre of MCA proceedings. In Re DD 
(No.4) (Sterilisation) [2015] EWCOP 4 (Fam), for example, sterilisation through the occlusion of the 
fallopian tubes was considered to be in the best interests of an intellectually disabled woman who 
had previously had six pregnancies, and the medical evidence suggested that a further pregnancy 
would seriously endanger her life. Importantly, in Re DD (No.4), it was noted that ‘considerable 
efforts … have been made to enable her to make the relevant decisions’ (at [7]). The difference the 
MCA has made in this area is that rather than sterilisation being considered as a first step in 
preventing pregnancy, for the convenience of those who care for women with intellectual 
disabilities, it is now appropriately considered a ‘last resort’, when other methods of contraception 
and sex education have failed. 
The MCA has made a great deal of difference to the lives of women with intellectual and 
psychosocial disabilities. The statutory presumption of capacity means that those who seek to 
override the wishes of disabled people must first prove that they lack capacity to make their own 
decisions. The focus in the MCA on the least restrictive option has ensured that fewer disabled 
women are subjected to sterilisation procedures. The MCA has also reflected, and perhaps 
catalysed, a shift in the discursive construction of capacity and intellectual disability. Yet the MCA 
model of using a functional test of capacity, alongside status provisions, and backed up by best 
interests substituted decision making has come under increasing levels of criticism in recent years.31 
The tension between objective best interests and prioritising the will and preferences of the 
individual, as suggested by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,32 is now posing 
significant challenges.  Finding a way to achieve the right balance between supporting disabled 
people’s autonomy whilst continuing to provide an appropriate level of protection for vulnerable 
people is the next big challenge in mental capacity law. The MCA has put England and Wales in a 
strong position to rise to that challenge, but we may well need to build another landmark to get us 
there. 
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